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A B S T R A C T
Building object (or asset) security has always been a burning subject in all systems and regimes since ancient times,
and will always be. The reason for this lies solely in the fact that these objects have a high material, historical, cultural
and other value. Therefore, the owners of such buildings, regardless of whether they are the public, civic or some other so-
cial institutions, organizations or individuals, have always paid, more or less, attention to the issue of security of such
objects. The amount of attention given to the security of these structures in general depends on the current situation of the
external and internal environment of the object, relative to the degree of security threats to it. Certain organizational –
technical activities are being performed with the aim to protect such objects. Up to which extent they will be used, depends
on the level of risk assessment of those objects that will show the possibility that incidents might occur with harmful con-
sequences. Poor risk assessment results in many unnecessary investments in the security, or lack of it, which does not of-
fer the necessary optimum of security. Hence, risk assessment in building security is considered to be a highly significant
and crucial matter. This paper presents a methodological approach to risk assessment in the overall process approach to
risk management in order to provide security to the objects. It delivers a critical overview of the methodological steps of
risk assessment with the intention to achieve the most realistic assessment.
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Introduction
Every object (including its asset) has some type of
value that can be (and has to be) eventually expressed in
quantifiable amount of money. According to the general
principles of objects and its owner’s relationship, such
object value must be preserved. Preservation of the ob-
ject value relies on its damage issue, which can decrease
value and/or functionality of the object itself, as well as of
another assets within that object, or directly related to
the object. The object’s owner obligation, in most cases,
is formally regulated by a certain document that is given
to the owner. Note that the term »owner« here means a
person who is responsible for all issues related to the
given objects value maintenance, or risk or object secu-
rity.
The object value runs within the limits from minimal
up to extremely high, or as it is sometimes known as end-
less value. Therefore, in respect to risk or security as-
pects, that value must be eventually quantified in some
way. Consequently, it can be done by using either the
quantitative or the qualitative method. Logically, the
higher the object’s value the more attention is needed,
and it requires usage of more techniques and tools to se-
cure the desired level of object’s security or perceived risk.
The relationship between the levels of risk and secu-
rity are reverse proportional, but both terms are directly
related to the necessity of the object’s value preservation.
Mathematical expression for the relationship between
the level of risk and security can be defined as follows:
Risk ´ Security = Constant (1)
On the other side, the relationship between the level
of security and uncertainty is complimentary and can be
shown by the following equation (in this case, constant
refers to wholeness or completeness):
Security – Uncertainty = Constant (2)
215
Received for publication November 29, 2013
In various literatures many different definitions of
risk and security can be found. However, in this paper,
the definitions given in standard ISO Guide 73 will be
used1. According to that source risk is effect of uncer-
tainty on objectives1. In the context of particular applica-
tion area, this risk definition can be relatively easily ad-
justed to, but the essence of it should always stay the
same. The object security area risk definition, which is
compatible with ISO standard, could be as follows: risk is
the effect of uncertaintyon the object functionality or
value. It could be noted that each object has its objec-
tives, which should be (has to be) achieved. For example,
any object can have the following objectives: functional-
ity, visual object form, preservation of other objects or as-
set inside or related to the considered one, etc.
In order to protect the object, it is necessary to give
the risk owner an answer with what kind and which level
of security should the object be secured with in order to
minimize or accept a risk of incident. It is logical that, in
case of unacceptably high risk level for incident occur-
rence related to the given object of protection, it is neces-
sary to implement, as a rule, a different type of protec-
tion than in the case when the risks are low. On the other
hand, any type of security tool implementation requires
some financial investment. Generally, the more the ob-
ject’s security, the higher the financial investment. The-
refore, the consequence of any security implementation
is a trade-off between the required low risk level and the
acceptable level of financial investment.
Physical risk principles
In order to confirm the risk level, or an object security
level, it is necessary to use a methodology that is gener-
ally accepted and recognized. It is compulsory because of
both the acknowledgments of the methodology results
and comparison of the risk to another object’s risk. The
risk theory states two approaches to risk assessment that
are well known – quantitative and qualitative2,3.
According to its definition, quantitative method of
risk assessment is based on measurable and objective
data that is used to determine risk value parameters. Be-
cause of the objective data, the risk assessment results
using quantitative method are entirely objective, too.
Evidently, the aim of the quantitative method is to objec-
tively calculate the numerous values for each risk param-
eter used in risk assessment context. Quantitative me-
thod for risk assessment is closely related to the mathe-
matical model in which different components that influ-
ence the risk level are connected. These are eventually
manifested with exact mathematical equation for risk
level calculation. The nature of the quantitative method
limits its application, though its accuracy is practically
not questionable. The most often application of the
quantitative method is in the financial risk area, while it
is almost not applicable in object security area.
The qualitative method, opposite of quantitative me-
thod, does not try to confirm the exact financial amount
of the asset’s (object’s) values, it’s expected losses and
necessary security measures. Instead, it utilizes some
relative values. They are expressed descriptively, and
their sizes are categorized according to rank. Examples
of the ranks are typically as follows: neglected, low, me-
dium, high, extreme, important, very important etc. The
scale numbers of the ranks for a parameter are not deter-
mined by a rule. It is rather a choice of the company
which uses the qualitative method. It is a general rule
that, if there are more ranks on the descriptive scale for a
particular risk parameter, there will be a bigger risk
value area, which is actually quite good. However, a grate
number of ranks on the scale for a risk parameter causes
difficulties for users. They can hardly differentiate why
acertain rank is associated to a certain parameter, and
not to the previous or the following one4.
Physical risk model for the qualitative assessment
method is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates all es-
sential components and their relationship to risk assess-
ment, based on qualitative method, as well as the secu-
rity measures for risk mitigation, preferably on an accep-
table level. Further, the figure also illustrates all the risk
complexity and multidimensionality. For any risk analy-
sis and assessment later on, it is necessary to first deter-
mine the object of the risk assessment, which can be lit-
erally anything or anybody, a material or nonmaterial
thing. An object of risk assessment can be buildings, ma-
chinery, people, etc. It should be emphasized here that
the object by itself is not directly the subject of analysis,
it is rather the objective(s) related to the considered ob-
ject at hand. Obviously, the choice of objects is unlimited.
Actually, the only limitation related to objects is the
knowledge or awareness ofthe object’s value and the im-
portance of its objectives achievement that should be an-
alyzed within risk assessment context.
Consequence analysis that can appear if identified ob-
jectives are not achieved will be the next logical step re-
lated to the chosen object. If the consequences of an un-
fulfilled objective are neglectable, then that objective can
be exempted from further analysis. This means that ir-
relevant consequences should not be considered at all5.
As a next step, for a given object and its chosen conse-
quences, we need to analyze which combination of threats
and vulnerabilities can cause that very same consequen-
ce. The sources of threats generate one or more threat
agentsthat can, more or less, jeopardize fulfillment of
one or more objectives of the considered object. How seri-
ous is that threat agent for an object goals achievement
depends on the object’s sensibility to that threat agent.
In the context of risk management, the term vulnerabil-
ity is usually used for object’s sensibility to various
threats. The vulnerability to one threat can be small, but
to another threat can be very high. This means that
threats and vulnerabilities by themselves are not impor-
tant for risks, but their combination certainly is. This is
why they say: If a threat exploits the object’s vulnerabil-
ity and causes a consequences, this means thatan inci-
dentor security relevant event with consequence for the
given object’s goal has occurred.
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In this definition, there is a complete mechanism of
risk development and its realization. To be precise, up to
the point of the incident appearance, a risk with a certain
likelihood for incident occurrence exists. An unpleasant
fact that follows risk analysis is that there are a lot of
threat sources, and each of them can generate more dif-
ferent threat agents. An object can be more vulnerable
on a certain threat, that is to say one threat can exploit
various vulnerabilities. Finally, each threat-vulnerability
combination can cause more consequences. Therefore, in
practice, risk analysis can be very complexand, as a rule,
requires great effort, expertise and experience of all the
participants involved in that process.
After all the potential risks and threat-vulnerability
combinations that can cause relevant consequences are
identified, it is possible to plan a defense. The risk miti-
gation on an acceptable level is primary stated under the
term defense. In defense planning, or risk mitigation, it
is possible to act against three factors – threats sources,
object vulnerabilities and consequences. According to
practical experience, the major effect on risk mitigation
can be achieved through acting on vulnerabilities. A
practical example of risk physical principles is shown in
Figure 2.
The threat source (Figure 2) for an object (house) is
an attacker (terrorist) who attempts to destroy the object
by explosives. If the attacker succeeds in setting up the
explosives and activates them, an incident – explosion
will occur. At the same time, there will be some damages
that causehigher or lower financial losses. Risk level
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Fig. 2. A practical example of an object risk elements.
Fig. 1. Physical risk model for qualitative risk assessment method.
magnitude of such security event (incident) is expressed
by likelihood. As incident likelihood is higher, the bigger
damages of the given object will be. How can risk be re-
duced, or how can the object’s damage probability be de-
creased? For example, some potential security measures
that could be undertaken are shown in Figure 2. Subse-
quently, source threat impact on the object can be re-
duced by various legal regulations (sanctions), active in-
telligence, etc. Object vulnerability for such kind of threats
and estimated consequences can be reduced by physical
protection such as security staff, fence, video monitoring
system, etc. The effects of consequences can also be re-
duced by taking out an insurance policy. Above stated are
only examples given for illustration of risk manifestation
reality and its analysis, including all major risk parame-
ters in qualitative risk assessment method6,7.
The qualitative risk assessment method most often
uses two or three parameters. The two variants of this
method are shown in Figure 3: one for three parameters
application (a) – threat, vulnerability and consequences,
and the other one for two parameters (b) – incident likeli-
hood and consequences.
In any given case, risk exists only if all three or two
parameters are important and if they are in interaction
among themselves in the object at acertain time. If two
parameters are used for risk assessment (Figure 3a) it
will be easier to assess risk, but it will also be more diffi-
cult to determine why likelihood is so high. In that case,
incident likelihood implicitly contents threat and vulner-
ability. In case of application of three parameters for risk
assessment (Figure 3b), it is more difficult to assess risk,
since more numbers of parameters must be assessed, but
the implementation of security measures is simpler.
Actually, it is possible to see directly why the risk is so
high – because of either high threat, and/or high vulnera-
bility, and/or high consequences. Hence, in the real envi-
ronment of risk assessment, one method for risk assess-
ment – with two or three parameters, should be chosen.
Mathematical Model of Qualitative
Risk Assessment Method
The question is how is it possible to perform mathe-
matical calculation of risk level, i.e. what is mathemati-
cal model of risk likelihood value calculation like. This is
very important step in risk assessment process, since all
later on activities connected to risk control or object se-
curity are based on calculated risk likelihood value. It
may be said that badly calculated risk causes incorrect
risk control and protection from it. The term badly im-
plies that the calculated risk is unrealistically high or
low. If calculated risk is unrealistically high, it will cause
unnecessary investments and expenses for the object se-
curity measures, and the effects will be the same as if
much less was invested in security based on the correct
risk assessment. On the other hand, if calculated risk is
too low, the main consequences will be insufficient in-
vestment (or expenses) in the object goal security, and
hence, the responsible people will believe that quality
protection based on this assessment has been provided.
However, in that case, the risk would most likely be real-
ized, and the resulting consequences could be numerous
times more expensive than the money spend on security.
Obviously, none of those two scenarios are acceptable.
Therefore, it is necessary to pay close attention to the
mathematical model and process of risk calculation. The
model itself must be sufficiently accurate and to guaran-
tee minimal number of acceptable error.
Traditional model of risk assessment is based on an-
swers to the following three questions:
1. What can happen?
2. What is the likelihood for it to happen?
3. If that happens, what will be the consequences?
If all of the three questions can be answered, it can be
concluded that the system risks are properly defined.
From this approach, risk can be defined as a probability
function of unwanted events and the significance of their
consequences8:
R = { < Si, Pi, Ci> } (3)
Where Si is i’s risk scenario, Pi – likelihood of that
scenario, and Ci is the resulting consequence. In that
equation, Si represents a set of all possible scenarios.
Since that set is practically infinite, it is not possible to
enumerate all of the plausible scenarios. As a result, and
because of the fact that there must be set a limit that the
scenarios are not inter-connected, the equation (3) will
be modified as follows:
R = { < Sa, Pa, Ca > }, a ?A (4)
Where a is a subset of practically infinitely large A set
of all possible scenarios. In such manner of definition, it
shows that a risk represents the set of risk values for
each scenario. This indicates that there is not just one
risk for a certain system, but rather theoretically numer-
ous risk factors, one for every scenario. The term sce-
nario implies a comprehensive set of conditions, circum-
stances and limitations, which lead to risk occurrence. In
this paper, due to simplicity of analysis, all equations will
rely on only one scenario, but at all time keeping in mind
that besides that risk, there are many more of them for
the same system (object).
Based on equations (3) and (4), a common and sim-
plest equation can be derived as the function of two pa-
rameters – event likelihood and consequences:
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Fig. 3. Most frequent parameters for qualitative risk assessment
method.
R = f(p, c) (5)
Where R = level of risk; p = likelihood of security
events (incident occurrence); c = consequence of the inci-
dent; f = mathematical function that gives the level of
risk in accordance to parameters values
As a rule, the type of mathematical function is defined
not only by the nature of the risk, but also by the risk
evaluation criteria. For example, it can be adding or mul-
tiplication function, or another complex formula. In case
of adding or multiplication function, the risk could be
calculated as follows:
Adding function: R = p + c (6)
Multiplication function: R = p ´ c (7)
The equation (5) for risk calculation is related to only
one incident likelihood, that originates from one source
of threat. Since in practice, there are situations where
many sources and many threats have affect on one ob-
ject, and they can cause many consequences, the equa-
tion (5) is getting more complex and becomes a set of
value couples, i.e. results in:
R = { f(p1,c1), f(p2,c2) … f(pn,cn) } (8)
However, it is true only in case where the degrees of
individual pairs are independent between themselves,
and only the pertaining p and care to be determined. In
case of new induced values of individual parameters
which can happen due to incident occurrence of certain
value pairs, the problem at hand becomes more complex
and will not be considered in this paper.
The mathematical equation for risk calculation that
uses only two parameters is not good enough in practice,
because within each parameter there can be many others
that are implicitly given. In that event, the simplest way
is to identify the problem and concentrate all the activi-
ties for risk mitigation on the parameters with best ef-
fect. For example, let’s take risk calculation with three
parameters – threats, vulnerabilities and consequences.
Then the mathematical equations (5) and (8) can be
shown as follows:
R = f (t, v, c) (9)
f is adding: R = t + v + c (10)
f is multiplication: R = t ´ v ´ c (11)
R = { f(t1,v1,c1), f(t2,v2,c2) …. f(tn,vn,cn) } (12)
Where R = level of risk for one combination of threat/
vulnerability/consequence; t=severity of threat; v = ex-
tent of vulnerability; c = significance of consequence
In the mathematical equation (9), the threats and vul-
nerabilities signify a scenario. Specifically, both the threat
and the vulnerability in great extent define the scenario,
which means a particular threat exploits certain vulnera-
bility and causes therisk to be calculated in such way. At
this point, many other various conditions related to the
given risk scenario can emerge.
In the case of the three parameters included in the
mathematical model, it is simpler to recognize risk physi-
cal nature and identify where to focus the optimal, and
sometimes only possible, mechanisms for risk mitiga-
tion: to the source of threats, and/or reduction of either
vulnerabilities or consequence, and/or some other combi-
nation of the later.
For both risk calculation models with two (5) and with
three parameters (9), the functional connection between
the probability and the combination pair of threat-vul-
nerability can be expressed by a new function:
p = k(t,v) (13)
k is adding: p = t + v (14)
k is multiplication: p = t ´ v (15)
Where p = security event likelihood; t = severity of
threat; v = extent of vulnerability
According to mathematical equations (13) and (15), in
case of one security event, risk can be calculated as fol-
lows:
R = f (t, v, c) = f(k (t, v), c) = f(p, c) (16)
f and k are adding: R = t + v + c = p + c (17)
f and k are multiplication: R = t ´ v ´ c = p ´ c (18)
However, the number of parameters that can be used
within the risk calculation process is not at all limited to
only two or three of them. How many parameters will be
really used in a specific case depends on both the risk cal-
culation problem and the risk analyst’s approach to risk
assessment. In this paper, only two and three parameters
for risk calculation will be analyzed and calculated, not
agreater number of parameters.
Practical methodical approach to risk
assessment by qualitative method
The explanation of the qualitative risk assessment
and analysis method is illustrated in Figure 4. The mech-
anism of risk calculation and the effect of security con-
trols implementation for risk mitigation are shown. For
risk assessment in this example, the three parameters –
threat, vulnerability and consequence are used.
Prior to the implementation of security control, the
risk is determined by three parameters R1 (t1,v1,c1),
where t1, v1 and c1 are the initial values of threat, vul-
nerability and consequence, respectively. If one or more
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Fig. 4. 3-D diagram of risk in function of threat, vulnerability
and consequence.
security controls that affect all risk parameters are ap-
plied to that risk, a new risk value determined by three
parameters, R2 (t2,v2,c2) will be obtained. That risk, R2,
is called residual risk and it represents the risk value af-
ter security controls are implemented onto the consid-
ered object.
The qualitative risk assessment method presumes
that the weight of the parameter used in risk calculation
is descriptively given in rated scale. An example of rated
scale for any parameter for qualitative risk assessment
method is shown in Table 1.
Number of rates in Table 1 is not limited, except by
practicality of application which depends on chosen na-
ture of the parameter, and compromise between wanted
and possible accuracy. The bigger accuracy is required, the
more rates there should be. However, there is a problem
here. How can we make a unique description for the rate
identificationin such way that rate k, but not k-1, or k+1 is
assigned to a parameter. Minimal number of rates in a scale
is two, and they can be described by features – »parameter
has influence« or »parameter does not have influence«.
This binary approach to parameter rating, as a rule, is un-
acceptable. Therefore, it may be said that the planning
scale with minimum three rates is an opportunism.
Even or uneven number of rates on a scale objectively
does not have any meaning, due to the fact that the num-
bers associated to the rates are not used either for some
mean value calculation, nor for some other reason which
would be in favor of even or uneven number of rates on a
scale. After all, uneven number of rates in a scale usually
prevails in practice.
Finally there is only one rule for defining number of
rates in a scale – practicality and functionality, depend-
ing on parameter type and the possibility to define cor-
rectly theidentification of each particular rate in a scale.
In practice, scales with 3 or 5 rates are used most often.
However, usually there are more of them, especially in
cases when some other numerical range that can be ex-
plicitly confirmed, can be used for rates description.
Those are typical scale values of objects (and their as-
sets), or similar to it. Practical applications of the risk as-
sessment process, according to qualitative method, are
shown in the following tables.
When defining the consequence parameter scale, it is
very important to determine the financial losses caused
by realized risk in a specific case. This means that the
loss of 10,000 can be a neglected consequence in some
situations, but a very high one in some other circum-
stances. In case of a two parameter (likelihood and conse-
quences) risk assessment method, the likelihood table
can be presented as it is in Table 5. The consequence
scale can be the same in both cases.
After risk assessment is performed and results are ob-
tained for all risks related to an object, it is necessary to
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TABLE 1
CRITERIA FOR DEFINING SCALE RATING OF PARAMETERS FOR QUALITATIVE METHOD
Rate No. Textual rate Description for category identification
1 Insignificant Unique textual description by which rate 1 is assigned to the parameter
2 Low Unique textual description by which rate 2 is assigned to the parameter
3 Medium Unique textual description by which rate 3 is assigned to the parameter
… … …
n Extreme Unique textual description by which rate n is assigned to the parameter
TABLE 2
EXAMPLE OF THREAT PARAMETER SCALE FOR QUALITATIVE METHOD
Rate No. Rate Rate description Description
1 L Low Very low likelihood occurrence of threat for object
2 M Medium Medium likelihood occurrence of threat for object
3 H High Very often or constant likelihood occurrence of threat for object
TABLE 3
EXAMPLE OF VULNERABILITY PARAMETER SCALE FOR QUALITATIVE METHOD
Rate No. Rate Rate description Description
1 L Low
There is no sensitivity to the threats, or very effective security controls have
been implemented
2 M Medium
Medium sensitivity to the threats, there is no protection, or security controls
are poorly implemented
3 H High
Very high sensitivity to the threats, there is no protection, or security controls
are inefficient
rate the risks according to a criteria established by risk
assessment team. The risk rate criteria is defined in the
so called risk acceptable matrix (ISO 31000:2009). It is a
two dimensional matrix determined by likelihood and
consequence parameters.
One potential definition of risk acceptable matrix is
presented in Table 6. The components of risk assessment
matrix represent risk values, classified according to the
rating scale. What the risk scale will be like mainly it de-
pends on the security policy which is defined and en-
forced by the top management.
Depending on the defined risk scale, i.e. risk accept-
able matrix, it is necessary to determine the security con-
trols and in which cases risk should be reduced to unac-
ceptable level. In Table 6, the risks in green fields are
acceptable and they do not need any security controls.
The risks in red fields are unacceptable, and they need to
be treated urgently and reduced to an acceptable level.
The risks in yellow fields should be mitigated to an ac-
ceptable level, provided there are enough resources, and
they must be monitored all the time.
Undertaking measures to reduce risk is usually called
risk treatment. Generally, there are four options for risk
treatment:
a. Risk acceptance – no matter how high the risk is, it
is accepted as it is, because it is within acceptable limits
or within unacceptable limits, but there are no objective
resources for its mitigation. In case that an unacceptable
risk level is accepted, top management should issue a
statement that they are awareofthe risk level and its con-
sequences, and that the risk will not be reduced due to
certain reasons.
b. Risk transfer – in this situation, a part of risk is
transferred to some other external organization, for ex-
ample to an insurance company. In this way the risks are
objectively reduced, and first of all the consequences.
c. Risk avoidance – in this situation, occurrences of
risk are disabled by different activities. As a rule, it is re-
solved by directives, orders, etc. For example, by a ban of
bringing in open flames in a building.
d. Risk mitigation – in this situation, some procedural
and technical controls are used to reduce risk, by influ-
encing some of the parameters – threats, vulnerabilities,
consequences and likelihood. Such risk reductions are
performed by implementation of security controls. The
term security controls implied needs for persistent con-
trol of risk (and security) level, and they are often called
security measures.
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TABLE 4
EXAMPLE OF CONSEQUENCE PARAMETER SCALE FOR QUALITATIVE METHOD
Rate No. Rate Rate description Description
1 L Negligible Loss < 1.000 
2 M Low Loss within limits 1.000–5.000 
3 H Significant Loss within limits 5.000–12.000 
4 E Extreme Loss higher than 12.000 
TABLE 5
EXAMPLE OF VULNERABILITY PARAMETER SCALE FOR QUALITATIVE METHOD
Rate No. Rate Rate description Description
1 L Rare Only in extraordinary circumstances
2 M Possible Could happen at any given moment
3 H Likely It will most likely happen in large number of cases
4 E Almost certain It is expected in most cases
TABLE 6
EXAMPLE OF QUALITATIVE MATRIX OF RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS
Risk = Likelihood ´ Consequences
Consequences
L M H E
Likelihood
L LL LM LH LE
M ML MM MH ME
H HL HM HH HE
E EL EM EH EE
Risk scale: Low Risk (LL,LM,LE,ML,HL,EL), Medium Risk (MM,MH,ME,HM,EM), High Risk (HH,HE,EH,EE)
Relationships between risk parameters and security
controls are shown in Figure 5, where a complete physi-
cal pattern of risk occurrence and control on an object
can be viewed from.
Interpretation of the processes in Figure 5 can be sim-
ply done by following the string of arrows from a block.
For example, a threat causes an attack to which a vulner-
ability is exposed and it results in a consequence.
Diagram in Figure 5 shows the complexity and the
problems of risk analysis, risk level calculation and risk
mitigation on an acceptable level as well. Unfortunately,
risk mitigation is not always possible due to different
reasons. Those are most often unacceptable expenses or
investments in securityifpredicted losses are less then
the security expenses.
All of the qualitative components of security risk as-
sessment method are shown in Figure 6. This diagram
can be applied to all types and classes of qualitative risk
assessment method. The only difference is in the number
and type of estimated objectives.
Project and process approach to security
risk assessment
The main question in security risk assessment of an
object is the choice of approach methodology. There are
two possible options – project or process approach. Ac-
cording to international standards, the project and the
process definitions are practically the same. Project (or
process) is documented set of activities that transforms
input into output values, with the help of resources and
rules. In the field of risk assessment, both project and
process approaches are presented in Figure 7.
The project and process approaches are shown in Fig-
ure 7a and Figure 7b, respectively. The difference be-
tween those two approaches are visible from diagrams in
Figure 7. The project once it starts, ends after some time,
meaning it is time limited. On the other side, the process
has its beginning, but it does not have its end, because it
is cyclically renewed in order to satisfy its input require-
ment. That is why it is called the period of the process cy-
cle. There are no other significant differences. Some-
times it is said that a project is one time process. If
somebody is to decide whether to apply process or project
approach, it will depend on input requirements (see Fig-
ure 6). In project approach, the input requirements is the
need for something to be done, and when it is done – the
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Fig. 5. Relationship of risk parameters, their occurrences
and levels.
Fig. 6. Integrated presentation of risk assessment by qualitative method.
project is finished. So, in Figure 7a the input require-
ment is to assess the risk. When risk assessment is fini-
shed, the project is finished, too. However, in process ap-
proach, the input requirement implies that constant
process activities should be performed in order to accom-
plish input requirement. Thus, input requirement in
process approach is to provide (persistently) risk man-
agement, or to control and retain the risk atan accept-
able level all the time. The process is finished at apoint
where there is no more need to fulfill input require-
ments.
Based on the above stated, it could be said that the
project approach should be applied when a one time set
of activities are needed to be achieved. Hence, risk as-
sessment from flood, or risk assessment from football
field devastation during asoccer game, are examples of
security risk assessment. On the other hand, the process
approach to security risk assessment should be applied
when there is a need to secure some requirements persis-
tently. For example, to provide protection from breaking
into an object.
Due to its duration and repetition, process manage-
ment can be continuously improved. That is why, during
a process cycle, insufficiencies could be detected, as well
as possibilities for improvement or optimization, and
therefore various changes will be included in the next cy-
cle. Thus, the new process cycle will run better, so possi-
bility for continuous process improvement are based on
that very principle. On the other side, one time projects
can not have further improvements. If some insufficien-
cies are noticed during the project’s flow, only some bad
activity results can be eventually improved.
Since a project can be considered as a one time pro-
cess, they are both almost the same. The fact that pro-
jects can not be improved is the only difference. There-
fore, in this paper processes will be considered instead of
projects.
There are many techniques and methods for process
improvement. The most well-known among them is
PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) process model or The
Deming circle. The PDCA model can be applied both for
the implementation and the improvement of existing
processes. The PDCA circle consists of the following four
phases:
• Plan phase: In this phase, for completely designed pro-
cesses, all resources and rules are identified and all ac-
tivities in the process flow that have to be accom-
plished are approved.It is necessary to plan who and
how will measure specific identifications in the pro-
cess. The expected results should be planned as well.
• Do phase: In this phase all of the planned activities in
the Plan phase must be practically implemented.
• Check phase: During this phase, it is verified whether
the results obtained by planned measures are within
the expected (planned) limits.
• Act phase: During this phase, all the reasons that lead
to deviations from expected (planned) results are ana-
lyzed. Based on the result of the analysis, certain activ-
ities are planned to avoid repetition of such deviations.
If there are deviations of results, some improvements
(efficiency and/or effectiveness) will be planned.
At the end of the Act phase, a new Plan phase begins
once again, with the aim to implement improvements of
the results of the previous Act phase. In such manner,
process performances are continuously and cyclically re-
newed.
The project approach has the same four phases too.
However, there are no options for project improvement
due to the fact that the project ends, after the Act phase
is completed, and so there are no more new cycles9.
If those components of process management theory
are applied in the field of risk management, no matter
for which purpose the risk assessment or the risk man-
agement are performed, they are achieved almost in the
same way. That is the reason why there are a lot of efforts
to define process managementand process assessment.
The most well-known and generally accepted, among
more or less many other successful approaches to define
the risk management process, is the international stan-
dard ISO 31000:2009. It is not compulsory to apply that
standard. It is rather a recommendation or best practice
example, which assists users on how to implement the
risk management process and continuously improve it.
In practice, it means that it is not possible to certify ac-
tivities according to that standard. However, today, it is
impossible that any risk management is to be performed
without ISO 31000:2009 standard’s principles (see Fig-
ure 8). Besides risk management process, both risk man-
agement principles and risk management framework, ac-
cording to ISO 31000:2009 standard, are also presented
in Figure 8.
The PDCA process model is also used to manage risk
management process, as shown in Figure 8. According to
ISO 31000:2009 standard10,11, in each particular phase of
PDCA model, there are following process management
activities:
• Plan phase: Risk identification, context determination,
risk assessment, risk treatment plan, residual risk ac-
ceptance
• Do phase: Implementation of security controls accord-
ing to risk treatment plan
• Check phase: Continuous risk monitoring and review-
ing
• Act phase: Risk management process maintenance and
improvement
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Fig. 7. Project and process approach to risk assessment.
The basic activities of particular steps within the risk
management process (see Figure 7) are as follows:
¿ Communication and consulting: It is correlated to
internal and external stakeholders during all the
step of the risk management process, and to the
process as whole.
¿ Context identification: In this step, external, inter-
nal and risk management contexts (in which the
rest of the process will be performed) are identified.
The risk assessment criteria and risk analysis
structure should be defined in this step, too.
¿ Risk identification: It is relayed on the identifica-
tion of where, when, why and how a security event
can be prevented, and/or mitigated, and/or shared,
and/or accepted, in order to increasethe achieve-
ment of the objectives.
¿ Risk analysis: It includes identification and assess-
ment of current security controls, and the determi-
nation of consequences, likelihood, and risk level.
Potential consequences range and how they can oc-
cur, must be considered, too.
¿ Risk estimation: In this step, a comparison between
assessed risk level and previously evaluated risk
level criteria is done in order to balance benefits
and disadvantages. It enables decision making on
risk assessment range and risk treatment nature
and priorities.
¿ Risk treatment: This step includes making and ap-
plication of the effective and rentable strategies,
specific expenses and action plans, in order to in-
crease potential benefits and decrease potential ex-
penses.
¿ Risk monitoring and reassessment: In this step, it
is necessary to follow up the effectiveness of the
overall risk management process steps. This is im-
portant for continuous improvement of the risk
management process. To assure that any changes of
circumstances can not change priorities, it is neces-
sary to closely follow risk and security controls ef-
fectiveness.
According to the standard ISO 31000:2009 steps, block
diagram of the processes in Plan phase (including related
documentation) is shown in Figure 9.
It does not matter if it is risk management process or
project, all the activities in the Plan phase and related
documentation should be implemented (see Figure 8).
Methodological approach to risk assessment, based on
ISO 31000:2009 standard, starts by risk range recogni-
tion, i.e. by range of risk assessment validity. It is related
to accurate definition of physical and functional limits of
the object for which the risk assessment is done. A formal
document that includes such description is an output of
this step. A formal definition of risk assessment objec-
tives is the next step in that risk assessment process. The
objectives are formally included in a document that is
usually called risk assessment or risk management secu-
rity policy. It is necessary to take into account that those
defined objectives are measurable. Based on these mea-
sures, it can be confirmed whether risk assessment or
risk management is effective. The next important step is
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Fig. 8. Relationship between risk management principles, framework and process.
to define the methodology for risk assessment. The same
risk assessment methodology often can not be completely
applicable to every object. Therefore, the outcome of this
step is a formal document »Risk assessment procedure«.
Definition of the consequences, threats, vulnerabilities
and likelihood scales is an integral part of that document.
The next step is object (or its asset components) identifi-
cation, which should be properly protected in order to
achieve the objectives that are defined in the security
policy. A list of asset inventory which isto be assessed is
this step’s outcome. In the risk analysis framework, the
next step is determination of all the risk factors that
could create losses. The risk estimation, based on the
chosen methodology from the Risk assessment proce-
dure, is the final step in the risk assessment process.
During this step, calculation of the risk factors using all
previous components is formally done. The document
Risk assessment report is this step’s outcome. Besides
the risk estimation results, it also includes the estimated
risk rating scale, in accordance to the risk level. If risk
management is required, then it will be necessary to per-
form a risk treatment step. What should be done with
each assessed risk is defined in this step. As it is men-
tioned before, acceptance, transfer, avoidance and miti-
gation are all possible options for risk management. For
each of these options, it is necessary to mention who,
when and how it will be performed, and what are the ex-
penses and risk levels after risk management options are
implemented, as well. The risk retained after risk man-
agement options implementation are called the residual
risks. The results of that risk treatment step are also in-
cluded in the Risk treatment report.
This final risk assessment report is sent for approval
to the sponsor that has ordered the risk assessment to be
done. Namely, the sponsor should accept all the risk as-
sessment results, planned expenses, and effects of the se-
curity controls. If the sponsor is unsatisfied and refuses
to accept the proposed security measures given in the re-
port, this step goes back to the beginning and is repeated
with adequate changes until the risk assessment report
is accepted by sponsor. Most often, the sponsor is making
atrade-off among expenses, timeframe and effectiveness
of the implemented security controls and desired objec-
tives. When the sponsor accepts The risk treatment re-
port and signs it, then the planned security controls can
be implemented. Hence, the sponsor is obliged to provide
all of the needed material and financial resources for se-
curity control implementation.
From the above stated, it can be concluded that this
methodological approach is completely logical and abso-
lutely independent from the field of application, as well
as from object (its asset) security. The main advantages
of this risk assessment methodology is that it is based on
ISO standards, as well as theclarity and lack of doubt for
the risk assessment process. The number of assets to
which this methodological approach can be applied is
practically unlimited. Some of the examples of object se-
curity are the following: building protection (from fire,
flood, burglary etc.), energy power protection, informa-
tion security, drinking water protection, concerts and
sports events protection, leaking of information from
companies etc.
Risk assessment techniques and tools
Within the risk management process, risk assessment
process is probably the most critical12. It means that any
mistake made in these steps can cause wrong risk assess-
ment results.That is why it is very important to approach
properly risk assessment components by using adequate
techniques and tools. Consequently, within standard ISO
31010:2009 many advices and instructions are provided.
Directions for the choice of risk assessment methodology
and techniques is one of them, too. A review of methods
and techniques applicable for risk assessment are pre-
sented in Table 7.
Obviously, all methods and techniques shown in Table
7 are not used at every situation. Those that are opti-
mally related to the given class of risk where a certain
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Fig. 9. Block diagram of Plan phase processes for risk management according to ISO 31000:2009
method is to be applied are usually chosen. Those tech-
niques and tools with label AP are first choice criteria for
certain class of problems – risk identification, conse-
quences, likelihood, risk level or risk assessment13. If due
to any reason, techniques and tools with label AP can not
be applied, then those with label P should be chosen.
Conclusion
Risk assessment is inevitable and very often critical
for any planning, especially in activities such as estab-
lishment and maintenance of object security systems.
Basic rules of any organization’s development includes
the rule of proactive management where risk assessment
is the source of all the following activities. Depending on
the area of application, it is possible to use quantitative
or qualitative risk assessment method. With type of prob-
lems such as object security, only qualitative method is
acceptable, despite the fact that it contains the risk as-
sessment evaluator’s subjectivity and is based on insuffi-
ciently proved components.
Since objectively, there is no way to prove that the as-
sessment is either accurate or wrong, the team of evalua-
tors must be trustworthy in ordertothe risk assessment
results to be accepted. Therefore, an expert that is trai-
ned for team work should perform risk assessment, since
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TABLE 7






assessmentConsequence Likelihood Risk level
Brainstorming SA NA NA NA NA
Structured or semi structured interviews SA NA NA NA NA
Delphi SA NA NA NA NA
Check lists SA NA NA NA NA
Hazard analysis SA NA NA NA NA
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) SA SA A A A
Hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) SA SA NA NA SA
Risk environment recognition SA SA SA SA SA
Structure »What if?« (SWIFT) SA SA SA SA SA
Scenario analysis SA SA A A A
Business impact analysis A SA A A A
Root cause analysis NA SA SA SA SA
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) SA SA SA SA SA
Failure tree analysis A NA SA A A
Event tree analysis A SA A A NA
Cause and consequence analysis A SA SA A P
Cause and result analysis SA SA NA NA NA
Level of protection analysis (LOPA) A SA A A NA
Decision tree NA SA SA A A
Human reliability analysis (HRA) SA SA SA SA A
Analysis »Bow tie« – graphical method of risk detection NA A SA SA A
Maintenance based on reliability SA SA SA SA SA
»Sneak« electro-mechanical assemble analysis A NA NA NA NA
Markov analysis A SA NA NA NA
Monte Carlo simulation NA NA NA NA SA
Bayes network and statistic NA SA NA NA SA
Graphic design of catastrophe-mortality relationship (FN curves) A SA SA A SA
Risk indexes A SA SA A SA
Consequences/likelihood matrix SA SA SA SA A
Cost/benefit analysis A SA A A A
Multi criteria decision analysis (MCDA) A SA A SA A
(SA = Strongly applicable, NA = Not applicable, A = Applicable)
every integrated risks is multidisciplinary. In team train-
ing, each team member or at least team leader must be
highly educated and skilled for application of different
risk assessment techniques and tools, and all the team
members should think in similar way in order to avoid
extremely pessimistic or optimistic attitude.
How important risk is, and in which way the risk as-
sessment results will be used primarily depends on the
awareness of the sponsor of the risk assessment and the
underlining reasons for the assessment. The main prob-
lem is that many operative and, as a rule, all strategic de-
cisions related to the object security are based on the risk
assessment results. Hence, wrong risk assessment re-
sults could cause faulty decisions with consequences that
could even destroy the object (or its asset).
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METODOLO[KI PRISTUP PROCJENI RIZIKA KOD ZA[TITE OBJEKATA
S A @ E T A K
Za{tita objekata je oduvijek bila prvorazredna tema u svim sustavima i re`imima od davnih vremena, a tako }e
uvijek i biti. Razlog za to le`i isklju~ivo u ~injenici da takvi objekti imaju visoku materijalnu, povijesnu, kulturolo{ku ili
neku drugu vrijednost. Zbog toga su vlasnici takvih objekata, bez obzira da li su u pitanju dr`ave, neke druge dru{tvena
institucije, organizacije ili pojedinci, uvijek poklanjali manju ili ve}u pa`nju za{titi takvih objekata. Veli~ina pa`nje
za{titi objekata op}enito zavisi o trenutnoj situaciji vanjskog i unutarnjeg okru`enja objekta, odnosno stupnju prijetnji
sigurnosti objekata. U cilju za{tite objekata poduzimaju se odre|ene organizacijsko – tehni~ke aktivnosti. U kojem
obimu }e se primjenjivati razni oblici za{tite objekata zavisi od procjene rizika da do|e do incidenta sa {tetnim poslje-
dicama. Lo{a procjena rizika ima za posljedicu da se nepotrebno mnogo investira u za{titu, ili nedovoljno, a da se ne
posti`e optimalna za{tita. Zbog toga se i smatra da je u za{titi objekata posebno zna~ajna i presudna procjena rizika. U
radu se prikazuje metodolo{ki pristup procjeni rizika s procesnim pristupom cjelokupnom upravljanju rizicima u cilju
za{tite objekata, te daje kriti~ki osvrt na metodolo{ke korake procjene rizika i to u cilju postizanje {to realnije procjene.
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